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Multiple fund investment situations and related
games
Stefan Wintein1 Peter Borm1 Ruud Hendrickx1,2
Marieke Quant1
Abstract
This paper deals with interactive multiple fund investment situations, in
which investors can invest their capital in a number of funds. The investors,
however, face some restrictions. In particular, the investment opportunities
of an investor depend on the behaviour of the other investors. Moreover, the
individual investment returns may differ. We consider this situation from a
cooperative game theory point of view. Based on different assumptions mod-
elling the gains of joint investment, we consider three corresponding games
and analyse their properties. We propose an allocation process for the maxi-
mal total investment revenues.
1 Introduction
Of the many decisions that a firm has to make, none is likely to have more impact
than the decision to invest capital, which often involves large, extended commit-
ments of money and management time. Such investment decisions determine the
company’s future course and, hence, its market value. It is not surprising, therefore,
that firms devote much time and effort to planning capital expenditure.
The importance of investment decisions is also reflected in the enormous amount
of attention that is devoted to it in the economic literature. In most of this litera-
ture on investment, firms are modelled as individually acting agents, ie, cooperation
between firms is not taken into account. Another assumption that is predominant
in the literature on investment, is that the agents face investment opportunities
that are exogenously given. That is, the investment opportunities of an agent are
1CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University.
2Corresponding author. P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. E-mail:
ruud@uvt.nl.
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not influenced by the investments of other agents; the strategic aspects of invest-
ment are often overlooked. In this paper, we analyse situations in which investment
opportunities of an agent depend on the behaviour of other investors. Moreover,
the situations will be analysed by taking into account the consequences of possible
cooperative behaviour.
In this paper, we introduce a new class of cooperative situations, called multiple
fund investment (MFI) situations. In an MFI situation, agents can invest their
capital in a certain number of funds. There are restrictions on the funds such
that there is a maximum number of capital units that can be invested in each of
them. The agents (players) in an MFI situation are characterised by the amount of
capital they can invest and by their individual returns on the different funds. That
is, we consider the possibility that the return of an investment project depends
on the player (eg, firm) that is involved in this project. Furthermore, investment
opportunities are limited; we assume that the total capital available exceeds the
total investment opportunities for which expected returns are satisfactory to the
players.
Our model of MFI situations resembles the model of transportation situations as
introduced in Sánchez-Soriano et al. (2001). A transportation situation can be seen
as an MFI situation in which also the funds are (controlled by) players and as a
result, these funds should also share in the revenues of the grand coalition.
In case there is only one fund available and all individual returns on this fund
are equal (say, 1), then the resulting situation boils down to a bankruptcy situation
(cf. O’Neill (1982)), where the fund restriction represents the estate and the indi-
vidual capital restrictions are the claims. As a result, our model can be seen as an
extension of the model of bankruptcy situations.
Associated with each MFI situation, we define three cooperative MFI games in
characteristic function form, which for the bankruptcy case all coincide with the
corresponding bankruptcy game. These games are based on three possible assump-
tions on the coalitional expectations of the return on their joint investments. These
coalitional expectations relate to the behaviour of the players outside the coalition.
To actually calculate the coalitional values of the MFI games, one has to solve linear
programs. These turn out to be transportation problems, allowing for a fairly quick
calculation of these values.
The central question in an MFI situation is how to divide, in an acceptable way,
the maximal total investment revenues of the players if they all cooperate and coor-
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dinate their investment plans in an optimal way. In this context, we study properties
of the associated cooperative games, in particular convexity and (total) balanced-
ness. We also propose a two-stage allocation rule for MFI situations. In the first
stage, an allotment is made, which gives each player investment rights in the various
funds. In the second stage, the players are thought of as facing a linear production
situation (cf. Owen (1975)) in which their investment rights and capital stock are
resources. Owen vectors of this linear production situation are then seen as solutions
of the original MFI situation. Stability of these solutions is shown.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces MFI situations and the
three corresponding MFI games. In section 3, the properties of convexity and (total)
balancedness of these games are studied. In section 4, we introduce the concept of
allotment and propose our two-stage solution method for MFI situations. In section
5, we elaborate on how our analysis can be extended when some of the assumptions
are modified.
2 The MFI model
A multiple fund investment or MFI situation is a tuple (N, M, e, A, d), where N =
{1, . . . , n} is the set of players, M = {1, . . . , m} denotes the set of available funds
and e ∈ RM++ is the vector of fund restrictions. An element ej denotes the maximum
number of capital units that can be invested in fund j ∈ M . Furthermore, A ∈
RN×M+ is the return matrix, where an element Aij denotes the revenue player i
obtains when he invests one unit of his capital in fund j. Finally, d ∈ RN++ is the








Let (N,M, e, A, d) be an MFI situation. In order to define corresponding MFI
games, we first state the program that determines the maximum revenue a coalition
S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅ can obtain when the fund restrictions are given by a vector z ∈ RM+ .
These direct revenues are denoted by DR(S, z) and defined by










Xij ≤ di for all i ∈ S,




Xij ≤ zj for all j ∈ M,
Xij ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S, j ∈ M.
For simplicity, we define DR(∅, z) = 0 for all z ∈ RM+ . By introducing a dummy
fund or player in order to obtain equality restrictions, this problem is translated into
a balanced transportation problem (cf. Hitchcock (1941)), which can be solved very
efficiently.
Facing fund restrictions z ∈ RM+ , the players in S will construct an optimal plan
XS ∈ RS×M according to this program in order to maximise their total revenue.
The set of all feasible plans is given by
FP (S, z) = {XS ∈ RS×M+ | ∀i∈S :
∑
j∈M




For a plan X ∈ RS×M , the corresponding revenues are given by the direct payoff
vector O(X) ∈ RS, where Oi(X) =
∑
j∈M AijXij for all i ∈ N . The set of all
optimal feasible plans XS is denoted by OP (S, z):
OP (S, z) = {XS ∈ FP (S, z) |
∑
i∈S
Oi(X) = DR(S, z)}.
Once the members of a coalition S have decided upon a particular plan XS, they
will invest their capital accordingly, thereby tightening the fund restrictions z for
the remaining players. The resulting fund restrictions z(XS) are given by
zj(X




for all j ∈ M .
Using this notation, we now introduce three TU games that correspond to an MFI
situation. A TU (transferable utility) game is a pair (N, v), where N = {1, . . . , n} is
the set of players and v : 2N → R is the characteristic function, assigning to every
coalition S ⊂ N a value v(S), representing the total monetary payoff the members
of S can guarantee themselves if they cooperate. By convention, v(∅) = 0.
Depending on how the “guarantee” in the last paragraph is interpreted, an MFI
situation gives rise to three TU games, which will be denoted by v1, v2 and v3.
The common feature is that first the players outside S can invest their capital and
afterwards the members of S invest optimally given the resulting (tightened) fund
restrictions. The difference between the games lies in the way the players outside S
are assumed to behave in the first stage.
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Let (N, M, e,A, d) be an MFI situation. The game v1 is defined by
v1(S) = min{DR(S, e(XN\S)) |XN\S ∈ FP (N\S, e)}
for all S ⊂ N . That is, the players outside S, facing fund restrictions e, are assumed
to choose that feasible plan XN\S for which the resulting revenue for S, facing fund
restrictions e(XN\S), is minimal. This pessimistic maxmin approach is standard
practice in cooperative game theory. In this interpretation, the “guarantee” to
coalition S is taken literally.
For our second game, we again take a pessimistic approach, but with the as-
sumption that the choice of the players in N\S is restricted to plans that maximise
their own total revenue. This implicitly assumes that the players outside of S do
act rationally. They choose an investment plan in OP (N\S, e):
v2(S) = min{DR(S, e(XN\S)) |XN\S ∈ OP (N\S, e)}
for all S ⊂ N .
For the third game, the players outside S also choose an optimal plan for them-
selves, giving them a revenue of DR(N\S, e). Next, we assume that the players in
S can persuade the members of N\S to change their investment plan as long as
those members still receive DR(N\S, e). Of course, coalition S will persuade them
to choose a plan in such a way that the two coalitions together generate a total
revenue of DR(N, e). After giving up the promised DR(N\S, e) to the members of
N \ S, the net revenue of coalition S equals
v3(S) = DR(N, e)−DR(N\S, e).
So, v3 is the dual of the “direct revenue” game which assigns value DR(S, e) to any
coalition S ⊂ N .
Example 2.1 Consider the MFI situation (N, M, e, A, d) with three players (rows)












 and d = (1, 4, 3).
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with total payoff 42 and direct payoff O(XN) = (10, 2, 30).
Next, take S = {2, 3}. In order to compute v1(S), we have to determine
where player 1 should invest his single unit of capital so that the resulting op-
timal payoff to S is minimal. If player 1 invests his unit in fund 1 (X1 =












. Hence, v1(S) = 26.
For our second game, player 1 has to invest in fund 1, which is optimal for him.
As a result, v2(S) = 32.
For the third game, we first determine DR(N\S, e), which equals 10 with plan
[ 1 0 ] for player 1. Hence, v3(S) = DR(N, e)−DR(N\S, e) = 42− 10 = 32.
In the following table, we list the direct revenues and the three coalitional values
of each coalition:
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} N
DR(S, e) 10 13 30 23 40 33 42
v1(S) 0 2 4 12 14 26 42
v2(S) 0 2 4 12 14 32 42
v3(S) 9 2 19 12 29 32 42
/
The first game is the most pessimistic, whereas the third game is the most optimistic,
as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 Let (N, M, e, A, d) be an MFI situation. Then for the three
corresponding games we have that v1(N) = v2(N) = v3(N) = DR(N, e) and
v1 ≤ v2 ≤ v3.
Proof:
The first part of the proposition follows immediately from the definitions. The rela-
tion between v1 and v2 is obvious. It remains to show that v2 ≤ v3. Let S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅
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and let XN\S ∈ OP (N\S, e), resulting in the revenue of DR(N\S, e) for coalition
N\S. Let XS ∈ OP (S, e(XN\S)), resulting in the revenue of DR(S, e(XN\S)) for
coalition S. If we combine the plans XN\S and XS, we obtain a feasible plan for
the grand coalition. Therefore,
v2(S) + DR(N\S, e) ≤ DR(S, e(XN\S)) + DR(N\S, e) ≤ DR(N, e).
Hence, v2(S) ≤ v3(S). ¤
Note that when |M | = 1 and Ai1 = 1 for all i ∈ N , then we basically have a
bankruptcy situation (cf. O’Neill (1982)). In this case, all three MFI games co-
incide with the corresponding bankruptcy game, defined by ve1,d(S) = max{e1 −∑
i∈N\S di, 0} for all S ⊂ N .
3 Properties of MFI games
In this section, we analyse some properties of our three MFI games. In particular,
we consider convexity and (total) balancedness.
A TU game (N, v) is called convex if (cf. Shapley (1971))
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T )
for all S, T ⊂ N .
In the following theorem, we prove that our most optimistic game v3 is convex.
Theorem 3.1 Let (N, M, e, A, d) be an MFI situation. Then the corresponding
game v3 is convex.
Proof: We prove convexity of v3 by showing that its dual, the direct revenue game
is concave. It suffices to show that
DR(S ∪ {t, l}, e) + DR(S, e) ≤ DR(S ∪ {t}, e) + DR(S ∪ {l}, e) (3.1)
for all S ⊂ N, t, l /∈ S. Taking the dual program of 2.1, it follows that DR(S, e) is
the minimal value of the following linear program
DR(S, e) = min
y∈RS ,v∈RM
ODS(y, v) (3.2)
such that yi + vj ≥ Aij for all i ∈ S, j ∈ M,
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yi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S,
vj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ M,





Now, consider the (dual) linear programs that are associated with DR(S, e), DR(S∪
{t}, e), DR(S∪{l}, e) and DR(S∪{t, l}). Suppose that (y∗, v∗) ∈ RS∪{t}×RM is an
optimal solution for the program associated with DR(S∪{t}, e) and that (y∗∗, v∗∗) ∈
RS∪{l}×RM is an optimal solution for the program associated with DR(S ∪ {l}, e).
So we have that ODS∪{t}(y∗, v∗) = DR(S ∪ {t}, e) and ODS∪{l}(y∗∗, v∗∗) = DR(S ∪
{l}, e).
From the structure of the linear programs, it readily follows that (ŷ, v̂) ∈ RS∪{t,l} ×
RM with ŷi = y∗i ∧ y∗∗i for all i ∈ S, ŷt = y∗t , ŷl = y∗∗l and v̂ = v∗j ∨ v∗∗j for all j ∈ M is
a feasible solution for the linear program associated with DR(S ∪ {t, l}). Similarly,
(ỹ, ṽ) ∈ RS ×RM with ỹi = y∗i ∨ y∗∗i for all i ∈ S and ṽ = v∗j ∧ v∗∗j for all j ∈ M is a
feasible solution for the program associated with DR(S, e). Since we have that
{
(y∗i ∧ y∗∗i ) + (y∗i ∨ y∗∗i ) = y∗i + y∗∗i
(v∗i ∧ v∗∗i ) + (v∗i ∨ v∗∗i ) = v∗i + v∗∗i ,
it follows that
ODS∪{t,l}(ŷ, v̂) + ODS(ỹ, ṽ) = DR(S ∪ {k}, e) + DR(S ∪ {l}, e).
Now, since (ŷ, v̂) and (ỹ, ṽ) are only feasible and not necessarily optimal, it follows
that
DR(S ∪ {t, l}, e) + DR(S, e) ≤ ODS∪{t,l}(ŷ, v̂) + ODS(ỹ, ṽ).
Combining the last two equations we obtain (3.1) and hence, v3 is convex. ¤
We proved convexity of v3 by showing that the direct revenues are concave in the
player set. That is, smaller coalitions benefit more from an additional player (in
terms of direct revenues) than do larger coalitions. On the other hand, the direct
revenues are convex in the fund restrictions; larger coalitions benefit more from an
increase in the fund restrictions (in terms of direct revenues) than do smaller coali-
tions. This is stated in the following theorem, which follows from Theorem 3.4.1(a)
in Topkis (1998).2
2We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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Theorem 3.2 Let (N,M, e, A, d) be an MFI situation. Then for all e′ ∈ RM such
that e′ ≥ e, we have
DR(T, e′)−DR(T, e) ≥ DR(S, e′)−DR(S, e)
for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N, S 6= ∅.
From convexity of v3 and from Proposition 2.1 it follows that all three games
are balanced, ie, that their respective cores are nonempty, where the core of a game
(N, v) is defined by
C(v) = {x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N




The games v1 and v2 need not be convex. However, the game v1 is totally balanced,
ie, for each S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅, the subgame (S, v1S) defined by v1S(T ) = v1(T ) for all
T ⊂ S is balanced.
Proposition 3.3 Let (N, M, e, A, d) be an MFI situation. Then the corresponding
game v1 is totally balanced.
Proof: Let S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅. In calculating v1(S), first the players in N\S use their
investment capital to lower the fund restrictions in such a way that the revenues that
thereafter can be obtained by S are as low as possible. Let XN\S ∈ FP (N\S, e)
denote an investment plan that is chosen by N\S for that reason. Consider the MFI
situation (S, M, e(XN\S), AS, dS) with AS = (Aij)i∈S,j∈M and dS = (di)i∈S. Denote
the corresponding most pessimistic game by v1,S. Trivially, we have that
v1,S(S) = v1S(S).
Moreover, we have that
v1,S(T ) ≥ v1S(T )
for all T ⊂ S. To see this, notice that the fund restrictions faced by a coalition T in
calculating v1,S(T ) are equal to the restrictions faced by T in calculating v1S(T ). Since
in the case of v1S(T ) this sum is distributed over the funds in the most pessimistic
way for coalition T , we have the stated inequality. Since v1,S is balanced, we have
that the subgame v1S is balanced and hence, v
1 is totally balanced. ¤
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4 MFI solutions: a linear production approach
In this section, we present a procedure for solving MFI situations, ie, we propose
a method of dividing DR(N, e) among the players. This procedure consists of two
stages. In the first stage, a division of the investment rights in the available funds
(an allotment) is made. An important aspect of this first stage is that an allotment
can be assigned without knowing the return matrix A. In the second stage, this
allotment is used as an input vector of a related linear production process and the
eventual allocation for the grand coalition is an Owen vector of this process. Inter-
estingly, it turns out that such an Owen vector is in the core of our most pessimistic
game v1, irrespective of the allotment that is made in the first stage.
Let (N,M, e, A, d) be an MFI situation. An allotment is an investment plan




for all j ∈ M .
An element Yij is interpreted as the amount that player i is allowed to invest in
fund j. When the players individually invest in the funds according to the investment
rights they receive from an allotment Y , a payoff vector O(Y ) ∈ RN+ results.
Example 4.1 One way to construct an allotment is simply to divide the investment
















Note that the corresponding direct payoff O(Y ) = 1
8
(57, 60, 126) is not efficient with
respect to DR(N, e) = 42. /
The payoff Oi(Y ) to player i ∈ N according to Y can be viewed as the direct revenue
of coalition {i} with fund restrictions (Yij)j∈M , ie,
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Oi(Y ) = DR({i}, (Yij)j∈M)
for all i ∈ N .
The players may decide to merge their investment rights and thereafter maximise
their joint revenues. Suppose a coalition S ⊂ N of players decides to work together.
Define




The joint revenues that coalition S can obtain when working together is then given
by DR(S, Y S). So, after an allotment Y is made, a new situation arises, which can
be modelled as a TU game. This game, denoted by vY , is defined by
vY (S) = DR(S, Y
S)
for all S ⊂ N .
This process of joining the investment rights according to an allotment turns out
to be a linear production process (cf. Owen (1975)). Let (N, M, e,A, d) be an MFI
situation and let Y be an allotment. Each player i is allowed to invest Yij units of his
capital di in fund j, resulting in revenues of Aij per invested unit. This is equivalent
with saying that each player i can produce one unit of a product pij by using one unit
of his “capital resource” (of which he possesses di) and one unit of his “investment
right in fund j resource” (of which he possesses Yij), with a market price for one unit
of pij equal to Aij. So the situation that arises after making the allotment Y can
be characterised as a linear production process L = (N, R, P, Q, B, c) (for notation,
we refer to Van Gellekom et al. (2000)), where the resource set R consists of |M |
“fund” resources {rf1 , . . . , rfm} and |N | “capital” resources {rc1, . . . , rcn}. Each player
makes |M | different products corresponding to the resources, so we define |N ||M |
products P = (pij)i∈N,j∈M . For n = 3, m = 2, the technology matrix Q then looks
as follows:
p11 p12 p21 p22 p31 p32
rf1 1 0 1 0 1 0
rf2 0 1 0 1 0 1
rc1 1 1 0 0 0 0
rc2 0 0 1 1 0 0
rc3 0 0 0 0 1 1
and the resource matrix B looks like this:
11
1 2 3
rf1 Y11 Y21 Y31
rf2 Y12 Y22 Y32
rc1 d1 0 0
rc2 0 d2 0
rc3 0 0 d3
Finally, the price vector c is derived from A:
c = [A11, . . . , A1m, A21, . . . , A2m, . . . , An1, . . . , Anm].
A linear production situation L = (N, R, P,Q, B, c) gives rise to a corresponding




for every S ⊂ N , where F (S) = {x ∈ RP+ |Qx ≤ (
∑
i∈S Bri)r∈R}. The Owen set of
L is defined by






where F ∗ = {y ∈ RR+ | y>Q ≥ c>} is the dual feasible set for the grand coalition and
the vector y reflects the shadow prices of the resources. An element of the Owen
set is called an Owen vector. Every Owen vector is an element of the core of the
corresponding linear production game:
Owen(L) ⊂ C(vL).
In particular, this implies that every linear production game is balanced. Also, since
every subgame corresponds in a natural way to a linear production situation which
is a subsituation of the original one, every linear production game is totally balanced.
So, when an allotment Y is made, the situation that arises can be viewed as a
linear production process. We refer to this process as L(Y ). It is easily verified that
the corresponding linear production game vL(Y ) coincides with vY .
Theorem 4.1 Let (N,M, e, A, d) be an MFI situation and let Y ∈ FP (N, e) be an
allotment. Then vL(Y ) = vY .
As a consequence, vY is totally balanced for every allotment Y .
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Given an allotment Y , we propose Owen(L(Y )) as solution for the MFI situa-
tion, where every Owen vector is an efficient division of DR(N, e) (= vL(Y )(N)).
Irrespective of the allotment that is chosen, the resulting allocation lies in the core
of the most pessimistic MFI game v1, as is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2 Let (N,M, e, A, d) be an MFI situation and let Y ∈ FP (N, e) be an
allotment. Then Owen(L(Y )) ⊂ C(v1).
Proof: Let S ⊂ N . Then
vL(Y )(S) = vY (S) = DR(S, Y
S)
and
v1(S) = DR(S, e(XN\S))
for some XN\S such that the resulting direct revenue for coalition S is minimal. So,











Also, we have that
∑
j∈M



















division of this sum over the funds is such that DR(S, e(XN\S)) is as low as possible.
Hence,
vL(Y )(S) ≥ v1(S).
Now, since any Owen vector of L(Y ) is in the core of the corresponding linear
production game L(Y ) and, trivially, vL(Y )(N) = v
1(N), the statement follows. ¤
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Example 4.2 Consider the MFI situation (N, M, e,A, d) of Example 2.1. Solving
the (dual) linear production program for the grand coalition yields a solution set
with two extreme points: (1, 7, 9, 0, 3) and (1, 4, 9, 0, 6), where the first two coor-
dinates correspond to the “fund” resources and the other three to the “capital”

































Note that Owen(L(Y )) ⊂ C(v1). However, the Owen solution (12, 12, 18) is not an
element of C(v2), since 12 + 18 = 30 < 32 = v2({2, 3}).
Computing the Owen set for all possible allotments yields the following allo-
cations: Conv{(9, 3, 30), (9, 22, 11), (10, 22, 10), (16, 16, 10), (16, 2, 24), (10, 2, 30)}3,
where Conv denotes the convex hull. The core of v1 is given by C(v1) =
Conv{(16, 4, 22), (10, 28, 4), (0, 28, 14), (0, 12, 30), (10, 2, 30), (16, 2, 24)}. Note that
the three faces that are most beneficial to players 1 and 3 coincide for the two sets,
while the core elements that are best for player 2 cannot be reached as an Owen
vector. /
The previous example shows that the allocations that can be obtained from our
procedure form a proper subset of C(v1). For bankruptcy situations, the two sets
coincide.
It follows from the construction of the linear production process that when a fund
restriction increases, the corresponding shadow price decreases, since the feasible set
of the dual program does not change. The impact of such a shift on the resulting
allocation, however, is not a priori determined, since it is unclear to what extent the
extra investment opportunities for this fund are offset by their lower shadow price.
3These allocations correspond to the dual optimal point (1,7,9,0,3). The other optimal point,
(1,4,9,0,6), does not yield additional allocations.
14
Suppose that for an allotment Y the corresponding direct division of revenues is
already efficient with respect to DR(N, e), ie,
∑
i∈N
Oi(Y ) = DR(N, e),
or equivalently,
Y ∈ OP (N, e).
Then the corresponding direct division of the revenues O(Y ) coincides with the
allocation that is proposed by the Owen set of the corresponding linear production
game. So according to this process there is no need to redistribute the allocation of
revenues as given by O(Y ). This is the result of the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3 Let (N, M, e,A, d) be an MFI situation. Let Y ∈ OP (N, e). Then
Owen(L(Y )) = {O(Y )}.
Proof: Consider the linear production process L(Y ) and let S ⊂ N . For the





because Y ∈ OP (N, e). Let y ∈ Owen(L(Y )). Since the Owen vector is in the core
of the linear production game, we have
∑
i∈S











for all S ⊂ N and hence,
Owen(L(Y )) = {O(Y )}.
¤
For an optimal allotment Y ∈ OP (N, e), the resulting allocation O(Y ) belongs to
the core of the most optimistic game v3, as is shown in the next theorem.
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Theorem 4.4 Let (N,M, e, A, d) be an MFI situation and let Y ∈ OP (N, e). Then
O(Y ) ∈ C(v3).
Proof: Let S ⊂ N . Then









Together with efficiency, we obtain O(Y ) ∈ C(v3). ¤
Because of Proposition 2.1, O(Y ) also belongs to C(v1) and C(v2). Note that for a
bankruptcy situation, every allotment is optimal and the resulting payoff vector is
in the core of the corresponding bankruptcy game.
To compare the various solutions, consider again the MFI situation of Exam-
ple 2.1. As we saw in Example 4.1, the direct payoff corresponding to the propor-
tional allotment is not efficient and hence, not an element of any of the three cores.
After constructing the corresponding linear production game and applying the Owen
procedure we obtained a solution set which is part of the core of v1, although not
of v2 (and hence, v3). According to Theorem 4.4, the direct division corresponding
to the optimal plan XN in Example 2.1 should be in all three cores, which is indeed
the case.
5 Extensions
One of the assumptions in our MFI model is that the total capital available is




i∈N di. Note that
this assumption is common in the bankruptcy literature (cf. O’Neill (1982)), where
the total amount of the claims (capital) exceeds the available estate (investment
opportunities). If we do not impose this assumption, we can still compute the three
corresponding games in the same way and the results of section 2 still hold.
The problem with dropping this assumption, however, lies in the concept of al-
lotment. An allotment is a feasible plan which is efficient with respect to the fund
restrictions. If the sum of the fund restrictions is larger than the total capital, such
a feasible plan does not exist. If we drop the requirement of feasibility of an al-
lotment and allow a player to have more investment rights than his total capital,
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Theorem 4.2 no longer holds. However, an allotment Y for which the direct division
of revenues O(Y ) is efficient with DR(N, e) is always in the core of all three games,
regardless whether we require an allotment to be feasible or not.
Another (implicit) assumption in our MFI model is that when a coalition S of
players decides to cooperate, they can coordinate their investment actions, but they
cannot pool their capital. If we allow capital to be transferable, the direct revenues
of S would be given by


















Xij ≤ zj for all j ∈ M,
Xij ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S, j ∈ M.
This maximisation problem is quite trivial to solve. For each fund j ∈ M , the
players in S determine ÃSj = maxi∈S Aij and invest their capital in those funds
with the highest ÃSj, taking the fund restrictions into account.
For this transferable capital case, we can define the same three corresponding
games as for the nontransferable capital case. Again, we have that v1 ≤ v2 ≤ v3
and that v1 is totally balanced. However, the game v3 need not be convex (or even
balanced).
Allotments can be defined in the same way as for nontransferable MFI situa-
tions, but the constructions of the corresponding linear production game is different
and involves the introduction of an additional resource representing “total capital”.
With this adjusted linear production situation, the analysis of Section 3 can be fully
translated to the transferable capital setting.
A more detailed discussion of these and other extensions can be found in Wintein
(2002).
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